Criticisms Phenomenalism

roderick chisholm criticized logical positivist version of phenomenalism in 1948. c.i. lewis had suggested physical claim there doorknob in front of me entails sensory conditional if should seem see doorknob , if should seem myself initiating grasping motion, in probability sensation of contacting doorknob should follow . chisholm objected statement there doorknob... not entail counterfactual statement, if so, must without regard truth or falsity of other statement; suppose following statement true: paralyzed neck down , experience hallucinations such seem see myself moving toward door . if true, chisholm objected, there doorknob in front of me, seem myself see doorknob, , seem myself performing correct sort of grasping motion, absolutely no chance of having sensation of contacting doorknob. likewise, objected statement book in front of me red not entail sensory statement redness appear me seem myself see book , because redness not appear under blue light-bulb. have tried avoid problem extending conditions in analysandum: instead of there doorknob in front of me 1 have there doorknob, , not paralyzed, etc. in response, chisholm objects if 1 complicates analysandum, 1 must complicate analysans; in particular case, 1 must analyse in purely sensory terms means not paralyzed , on, respect same problems arise leading infinite regress.

another common objection phenomenalism in process of eliminating material objects language , replacing them hypothetical propositions observers , experiences, seems commit existence of new class of ontological object altogether: sensibilia or sense-data can exist independently of experience. indeed, sense-data have been dismissed philosophers of mind, such donald davidson, mythological entities more troublesome entities intended replace.

a third common objection in literature phenomenalism, in attempting convert propositions material objects hypothetical propositions sensibilia, postulates existence of irreducibly material observer in antecedent of conditional. in attempting overcome this, phenomenalists suggested first observer reduced constructing second proposition in terms of second observer, or potentially observes body of first observer. third observer observe second , on. in manner end chinese box series of propositions of ever decreasing material content ascribed original observer. if final result not complete elimination of materiality of first observer, translational reductions proposed phenomenalists cannot, in principle, carried out.

another criticism phenomenalist can give no satisfactory explanation of permanent possibilities of experience. question can asked, counterfactual conditionals ground existence of objects true in virtue of? 1 answer given phenomenalists conditionals true in virtue of past regularities of experience. however, critics object answer leads circularity: first our actual experience meant explained possibility of experience, , possibility of experience meant explained our actual past experience. further objection phenomenalist answer speaking, conditionals not true in virtue of past occurrences. because seems conditional true if never obtained, , past occurrences confirm conditional true, never make so.

roderick firth formulated objection in 1950, stemming perceptual relativity: white wallpaper looks white under white light , red under red light, etc. possible course of experience resulting possible course of action apparently underdetermine our surroundings: determine, example, there either white wallpaper under red light or red wallpaper under white light, , on. on basis decide of hypotheses correct 1 if constrained rely exclusively on sensibilia?