September 11 attacks Saudi Arabia–United States relations

on september 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on new york city , washington, d.c. , in field near shanksville, pennsylvania 4 hijacked airplanes killed 2,977 victims , cost estimated $150 billion in property , infrastructure damage , economic impact, exceeding death toll , damage caused japanese attack on pearl harbor 60 years earlier. 15 of 19 hijackers in attacks came saudi arabia, did leader of hijackers organization, (osama bin laden). in u.s., there followed considerable negative publicity for, , scrutiny of, saudi arabia , teaching of islam, , reassessing of oil-for-security alliance al saud. 2002 council on foreign relations terrorist financing task force report found that: “for years, individuals , charities based in saudi arabia have been important source of funds al-qaeda. , years, saudi officials have turned blind eye problem.”

in backlash against saudi arabia , wahhabism, saudi government portrayed in media, senate hearings, , elsewhere as

a sort of oily heart of darkness, wellspring of bleak, hostile value system antithesis of our own. america s seventy-year alliance kingdom has been reappraised ghastly mistake, selling of soul, gas-addicted alliance death.

there proposal @ defense policy board, (an arm of department of defense) consider `taking saudi out of arabia` forcibly seizing control of oil fields, giving hijaz hashemites, , delegating control of medina , mecca multinational committee of moderate, non-wahhabi muslims.

the saudi government issued statement on day of attacks calling them regrettable , inhuman. saudi recognition taliban (which worked bin laden) stopped , of november 2001, bush administration continued publicly praise saudi support war on terrorism. however, published media reports have indicated u.s. frustration saudi inaction. although 15 of 19 hijackers saudi nationals, publicly saudis not cooperating americans wanting @ background files of hijackers or interview hijackers families.

in saudi arabia itself, anti-american sentiment described intense , @ all-time high .

a survey taken saudi intelligence service of educated saudis between ages of 25 , 41 taken shortly after 9/11 attacks concluded 95 percent of surveyed supported bin laden s cause. (support bin laden reportedly waned 2006 , then, saudi population become considerably more pro-american, after al-qaeda linked groups staged attacks inside saudi arabia.) proposal @ defense policy board `take saudi out of arabia` spread secret plan kingdom.

in october 2001, wall street journal reported crown prince abdullah sent critical letter u.s. president george w. bush on august 29. warned saudi arabia being put in untenable position lack of response israel-palestinian violence, , reportedly wrote: time comes when peoples , nations part. @ crossroads. time united states , saudi arabia @ separate interests. governments don t feel pulse of people , respond suffer fate of shah of iran.

for on year after 9/11 saudi minister of interior (a powerful post jurisdiction included domestic intelligence gathering), prince nayef bin abdul-aziz al saud, insisted saudi hijackers dupes in zionist plot. in december 2002, saudi government spokesman declared country victim of unwarranted american intolerance bordering on hate.

in 2003, several terror attacks targeted u.s. compounds, saudi ministry of interior, , several other places occurred inside saudi arabia. result of these attacks, u.s. decided redevelop saudi law enforcement agencies providing them anti-terrorism education, latest technologies, , giving them chance interact u.s. law enforcement agencies gain efficient knowledge , power needed handle terrorist cases , enforce anti-terrorist laws.

although analysts have speculated osama bin laden, in 1994 had saudi nationality revoked , expelled saudi arabia, had chosen 15 saudi hijackers on purpose break u.s.–saudi relations, u.s. still suspicious of saudi arabia (pbs frontline, 2005). saudi s decided cooperate u.s. on war on terror. terrorism not belong culture, or religion, or political system , said king abdullah opening address of counter-terrorism international conference (ctic) held in riyadh in 2005. cooperation grew broader covering financial, educational, technological aspects both in saudi arabia , muslim-like countries prevent pro-al-qaeda terrorists activities , ideologies. high time ulma (muslim scholars), , thinkers, intellectuals, , academics, shoulder responsibilities towards enlightenment of people, young people, , protect them deviant ideas said sheikh saleh bin abdulaziz alsheikh, minister of islamic affairs, in ctic.

almost members of ctic agreed al-qaeda target less educated muslims convincing them warriors of god, convince them accomplish political goals. 3 years after saudi serious , active role on anti-terrorist, al-qaeda began launching multiple attacks targeting saudi government buildings , u.s. compounds in saudi grounds (alshihry, 2003). attacks exhibits revenge against saudi arabia s cooperation u.s. trying stop further us–saudi anti-terrorist movements , trying corrode us-saudi relationship , annihilate it.

after these changes, saudi government more equipped in preventing terrorist activities. caught large number of saudi terrorists , terrorists other countries (some of them american) had connections al-qaeda in 1 way or (u.s. department of state 2007). of these criminals held high rank in terrorist society, helped diffuse many terrorist cells (alahmary, 2004). in matter of months, saudi law enforcement officials able stop , prevent terrorist activities. also, successful in finding source of terrorist financing.